Why a Bank of Canada hike on October 28 is less likely than Polymarket prices
The Bank of Canada has held at 2.25% seven times, with core inflation near 2%. On September 20 Polymarket gave a quarter-point hike on October 28 a 38% chance.
Will the Bank of Canada raise its rate a quarter point on October 28?
The Bank of Canada has held its policy rate at 2.25% for seven straight decisions, since a quarter-point cut on October 29, 2025 (Bank of Canada, 2026b). Its next decision, with a new Monetary Policy Report, comes on October 28, 2026 (Bank of Canada, 2026b). The Bank aims for inflation of 2%, the middle of a 1% to 3% band (Bank of Canada, 2026c).
Polymarket lists a contract that pays if the Bank raises its rate by a quarter point, to 2.50%, at the October announcement, and its rules count any smaller increase as a quarter point (Polymarket, 2026). Polymarket prices the contract in cents on the dollar, so a price of 38 cents means traders put the chance of a hike at 38 in 100, a little better than one in three.
On September 20 that price stood at 38.0%, the midpoint between the best offers to buy and to sell. Our forecast, registered the same day, put the hike at 15.9%, about one chance in six (Fig. 1). The band our arithmetic draws around that forecast runs from 7.4% to 27.3%, wholly below the market’s price. Most of the 22.1-point gap comes from one estimate about how central banks behave. On our reference-class estimate, a bank this long on hold, warning about inflation while its core measure sits inside the 1% to 3% band, hikes at the very next meeting about one time in five.
Polymarket's 38% for an October hike sits above the bands around both our forecast and the base rate it starts from.
Dots are the base rate from our reference-class estimate of 8 hikes in 40 cases, our forecast and Polymarket's midpoint; bars are the 95% bands our arithmetic draws around the first two, and Polymarket's bid to ask.
On our estimate, a hike from a long hold comes about one time in five
A central bank whose core inflation sits inside its band has no trigger for a hike, so after a hold its usual next step is another hold. Our reference-class estimate puts the exception at about 8 hikes in 40 comparable cases, which gives an anchor of 20.7% before any argument about Canada (Fig. 1). On its own, that anchor sits 17.3 points below Polymarket’s price, nearly four-fifths of the whole gap. The five forces that follow move the number a further 4.9 points (Fig. 2).
The base rate makes most of the gap between our forecast and Polymarket's price.
The two steps from Polymarket's 38.0% midpoint down to our 15.9% forecast, in percentage points: first to the base rate of our reference-class estimate, then through the five scored forces.
The Bank of Canada’s own practice points the same way. It measures inflation as the 12-month change in the CPI, but in setting policy it looks through temporary swings in volatile prices and uses core measures as its operational guide (Bank of Canada, 2026d). On September 2 it warned that upside risks to inflation had increased and still left the rate where it was, saying the Governing Council is “prepared to adjust monetary policy as needed” (Bank of Canada, 2026a).
The Bank’s record over the past year is the live case of that pattern. It left its rate at 2.25% at seven straight decisions, from December 10, 2025 to September 2, 2026, after quarter-point cuts on September 17 and October 29, 2025 (Bank of Canada, 2026b). The last of those holds came with oil already rising: Brent crude, the global benchmark, went from about $90 a barrel on August 28 to about $98 on September 2 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026). In the forecast the seven holds also count as a force of their own, and they lower the number by 1.1 points.
Central banks have sometimes hiked into a surge in commodity prices, and the European Central Bank did so in 2008 and again in 2011. The ECB held its main rate at 4.00% from June 2007 and raised it to 4.25% on July 3, 2008 (European Central Bank, 2026). It cited June inflation of 4.0%, which it said came largely from energy and food prices (European Central Bank, 2008a). Three months later, on October 8, 2008, it cut by half a point, in a move announced jointly with the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve as the financial crisis deepened (European Central Bank, 2008b). In 2011 it hiked in April and July, with inflation it tied largely to higher commodity prices, and two cuts by December took its main rate back to 1.00% (European Central Bank, 2011; European Central Bank, 2026). Both episodes were reversed within months.
To match the market’s price with the same forces, our estimate would have to be about 18 hikes in 40 cases, nearly an even split between hiking and holding. The Bank’s practice of looking through swings in energy prices argues against odds that high, and counting the historical record of such decisions is the check that would settle the size.
The inflation the Bank watches most sits at or under 2%
The core inflation the Bank of Canada uses as its guide sat at or under its 2% target in August. That is the largest single force in our forecast, and it lowers the chance of an October hike by 2.3 points. Statistics Canada’s August figures, published on September 14, put CPI-trim at 1.9% and CPI-median at 2.0% on the year, the two core measures TD Economics calls the Bank’s preferred ones (Fig. 3; Statistics Canada, 2026b; Preston, 2026). Both stood at the same levels in July, and on September 2 the Bank said that measures of core inflation “remained close to 2% in July” (Statistics Canada, 2026b; Bank of Canada, 2026a).
In August the Bank of Canada's two preferred core measures sat at or under its 2% target, while all-items inflation ran at 3.0%.
Change on a year earlier in six August CPI measures, percent; the line marks the target.
Headline inflation is higher, and it has run near 3% for months on the price of gasoline. All-items inflation was 3.0% in August, the same as in July (Statistics Canada, 2026a). Gasoline prices were 22.8% above a year earlier, after a 25.7% rise in July, and Statistics Canada reported that the slower rise in gasoline pulled the index down while higher prices for travel tours and rent pushed it back up (Statistics Canada, 2026a). Prices excluding gasoline rose 2.4%, up from 2.2% in July (Statistics Canada, 2026a). Excluding food and energy, prices rose 2.1% (Statistics Canada, 2026d), and the third core measure, CPI-common, ran higher at 2.6% (Statistics Canada, 2026b). The September oil spike falls after the August reference period, so it first reaches the index in the September figures due on October 19 (Statistics Canada, 2026c).
A trade fight and the banks’ economists give the Bank reasons to wait
A renewed trade dispute with the United States gives the Bank a reason to wait, and in our forecast it lowers the chance of an October hike by 1.1 points. On September 2 the Bank of Canada reported new US tariffs and Canadian counter-measures after trade talks broke down (Bank of Canada, 2026a). Its September 16 summary of the Governing Council’s deliberations put the tariffs on roughly 5% of Canadian goods exports to the United States, and said the renewed uncertainty would weigh on confidence (Bank of Canada, 2026c). Members held a range of views on how far that would slow the economy, and the summary noted that, with spare capacity and a soft labour market, weaker growth could keep inflation pressures contained (Bank of Canada, 2026c).
Economists at two Canadian banks argued against a near-term hike, on different evidence, and their view lowers the number by 0.4 points, the smallest of the four forces that push it down. National Bank Financial wrote on September 2, before the August CPI, that it expected a hold until hikes in the first quarter of 2027 (Schleich and Currie, 2026). TD Economics wrote on September 14, after the August figures, that the report did not support the degree of tightening markets had begun to price, and that core inflation should stay within the Bank’s comfort zone (Preston, 2026).
Polymarket’s case is that an oil shock can move a patient bank
The strongest case for a hike starts with the jump in oil prices in September. Brent crude rose 46% in under three weeks after August 28, to $131 a barrel on September 15, and none of that rise is in the CPI yet (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026). Headline inflation had already sat near the top of the Bank’s 1% to 3% band since April, on gasoline prices more than a fifth above a year earlier (Bank of Canada, 2026c; Statistics Canada, 2026a).
The Bank’s own words left the door open, and that hawkish language on energy is the one force in our forecast that raises the number, by 0.4 points. Its September 2 statement said recent data reaffirmed its view of a broadening recovery, after second-quarter GDP growth of 3.3%, and that upside risks to inflation had increased (Bank of Canada, 2026a). The Governing Council’s September 16 summary went further: members agreed that if higher energy prices spilled over into other prices, it could require a monetary policy response to stop broad-based inflation from setting in (Bank of Canada, 2026c).
Economists at both banks acknowledged the opening. TD Economics wrote on September 14 that the Bank’s core measures “started to drift a bit above 2%” in August: measured over that month alone and scaled up to a year, they ran at 2.7% (Preston, 2026). National Bank Financial wrote on September 2 that “on the surface then, the next meeting is ‘live’”, before adding that it would be “very surprised” if the Bank tightened that soon (Schleich and Currie, 2026).
Markets leaned toward a hike in the days after the summary appeared. On the day it came out, Wednesday, September 16, the Federal Reserve raised its target range, which put its upper bound at 4.00% from September 17, 1.75 points above Canada’s rate (The Canadian Press, 2026; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026). The Canadian Press reported on September 18 that markets saw the October decision as a coin flip, narrowly in favour of a hike (The Canadian Press, 2026). Polymarket moved further that way, and on September 24 its midpoint stood at 44.7%, 6.7 points above its September 20 level (Polymarket, 2026).
Our answer rests on what the Bank itself says drives its decisions. It looks through temporary swings in volatile prices and uses core measures as its guide to underlying inflation (Bank of Canada, 2026d). Its September 16 summary said the Governing Council had so far been looking through the initial direct impact of gasoline prices on inflation, and it tied any response to spillover into other prices (Bank of Canada, 2026c). On the measures the Bank uses as its guide, core inflation over the full year to August was at or under 2%, so TD’s 2.7% is a single month’s pace (Fig. 3; Preston, 2026).
The Bank held on September 2 with oil already climbing, and the oil market then priced the spike to fade. On September 18 Brent cost about $120 a barrel for immediate delivery, while DTN reported the contract for November delivery at about $105 that morning (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026; Bastati, 2026). An October hike would repeat the ECB’s hikes of 2008 and 2011, both made into a surge in commodity prices and both reversed within months (European Central Bank, 2026).
What to watch before October 28
Statistics Canada publishes the September Labour Force Survey on October 9 (Statistics Canada, 2026c). A clear fall in employment would confirm the trade force and push our number lower, while a strong gain would weaken it.
September CPI follows on October 19, and it is the first release to carry the oil spike (Statistics Canada, 2026c). If CPI-trim or CPI-median rises above 2.5% on the year, energy would be reaching the core measures the Bank uses as its guide, and Polymarket’s case would gain ground. If both stay near 2%, the core force holds, whatever the headline does.
Brent stood at about $115 on September 22, 12% below its peak a week earlier (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026). A return above $131 before the decision would strengthen the energy force, and a slide back toward $90 would take most of it away.
Speeches by Governing Council members can shift the picture only until October 20. Under the Bank’s blackout guidelines, members stop giving speeches on the Tuesday eight days before a decision with a Monetary Policy Report (Bank of Canada, 2026e). Governor Macklem said on September 21 that the Bank had been looking through the direct impact of higher oil prices, and that it would assess whether the current rate balances the risks to its inflation outlook (Macklem, 2026). A speech before October 20 that drops the looking-through language would favour Polymarket’s side.
The Bank of Canada announces its decision, with the October Monetary Policy Report, on October 28, 2026 (Bank of Canada, 2026b). Until then the question is open, and that announcement will settle our forecast of 15.9%.
How we got the number
What the forecast knew, and when
The forecast answers Polymarket’s contract “Will the Bank of Canada increase the target for the overnight rate by 25 bps at the October interest rate announcement?”, which pays on the Bank’s October 28, 2026 decision; its rules round any increase under 25 basis points up to 25 (Polymarket, 2026). Its public sources were gathered at 17:05:38 UTC on September 20, 2026, and its inputs were fixed two minutes later, at 17:07:26 UTC. Polymarket’s quote was taken half an hour after that, at 17:38:01 UTC, and the forecast was registered at 17:41:35 UTC, 38 days before the decision (Table 1). The market price was withheld from the forecast by design. The record carries an information date of September 14, the day of the August CPI release; the latest evidence it cites is dated September 18.
The forecast record cites four public documents: the Bank of Canada’s September 2 rate announcement, its September 16 summary of deliberations, TD Economics’ September 14 CPI commentary and the Canadian Press report of September 18 (Bank of Canada, 2026a; Bank of Canada, 2026c; Preston, 2026; The Canadian Press, 2026). Its recorded evidence also carries August CPI figures, Brent spot prices and the federal funds target. The oil futures levels it gives for September 18 do not match DTN’s published report of that day, and that force was not scored into the number (dataset boc-forces; Bastati, 2026).
We used further sources afterwards to check the forecast, and none of them fed it: the Bank of Canada’s policy rate table (Bank of Canada, 2026b); Statistics Canada’s September 14 release, its Table 1 of major components and its Table 4 of core measures (Statistics Canada, 2026a; Statistics Canada, 2026d; Statistics Canada, 2026b); National Bank Financial’s September 2 policy monitor (Schleich and Currie, 2026); the FRED series for Brent spot and the federal funds target (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026); DTN’s September 18 futures report (Bastati, 2026); Statistics Canada’s release calendar, published June 10 (Statistics Canada, 2026c); and Polymarket’s contract rules (Polymarket, 2026). For this paper we also consulted, on September 24, the European Central Bank’s key rate history and its statements of July 3, 2008, October 8, 2008 and April 7, 2011, the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy page and blackout guidelines, and Governor Macklem’s speech of September 21 (European Central Bank, 2008a; European Central Bank, 2008b; European Central Bank, 2011; European Central Bank, 2026; Bank of Canada, 2026d; Bank of Canada, 2026e; Macklem, 2026). The pages consulted on September 24, including the Bank’s standing description of its policy, are later context and were not inputs, as are oil prices dated after September 20, the Polymarket quote of September 24 and the September 21 speech.
The recorded argument names nine forces. Five were scored into the number, and four were carried as context without a score: the oil futures curve, the US rate hike, immigration and the size of a first hike (dataset boc-forces). The public trace for each force, including where the record’s evidence could not be matched to a public source, is in the same dataset.
Table 1. Event definition and chronology. Sources: the forecast record, the contract rules and Polymarket quotes (Polymarket, 2026).
| Item | Recorded value |
|---|---|
| Target | A 25 basis point increase, 2.25% to 2.50%, at the October 28, 2026 announcement; smaller increases round to 25 |
| Public sources gathered | 17:05:38 UTC, September 20, 2026 |
| Inputs fixed | 17:07:26 UTC, September 20, 2026 |
| Polymarket at registration | Bid 37.4%, ask 38.6%, midpoint 38.0%, spread 1.2 points, quoted 17:38:01 UTC |
| Polymarket liquidity recorded | $3,014 |
| Forecast registered | 15.9%, band 7.4% to 27.3%, 17:41:35 UTC, September 20, 2026 |
| Polymarket, later context | Bid 43.5%, ask 45.9%, midpoint 44.7%, September 24, 2026, 14:17:37 UTC |
| Settlement | The Bank of Canada decision of October 28, 2026 |
The calculation
The forecast starts from a reference class recorded with it: scheduled meetings of G7 and other advanced-economy central banks from January 2000 to September 20, 2026, where the prior decisions were at least four consecutive holds, the bank’s communication flagged upside inflation risk, and its preferred core measure sat inside the 1% to 3% target band. The outcome is a 25 basis point hike at the very next meeting. Emergency moves, liftoff from the zero lower bound and meetings inside an active hiking cycle are excluded. The recalled counts were 8 hikes in 40 cases (Table 2). A Jeffreys prior turns those counts into an anchor $p_0$ and a band $B$ (Eq. 1).
With $k=8$ and $n=40$, Eq. 1 gives an anchor of 20.73%, and the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the Beta distribution give a band of 9.94% to 34.22%.
Each qualitative factor carries a signed log-odds score of 0.2, 0.5 or 1.0, by strength, negative when it lowers the chance, and the sum $s$ is capped at two in either direction. That sum is shrunk by an evidence weight $\lambda$ and by a selection weight that shrinks as the number of variants $V$ tried before settling on the class rises (Eq. 2). The evidence weight is the recorded 0.5, capped at 0.25 when the anchor band’s half-width exceeds 0.15 and at 0.75 otherwise; this band’s half-width is 12.14 points, so 0.5 stands (Table 2).
The final estimate adds the shrunk sum to the anchor on the log-odds scale (Eq. 3), and the same shift moves both ends of the anchor’s band. With $V=61$ the selection weight is 0.3273, and the combined weight $w$ is 0.1636. The five factors summed to $-2.0$ log-odds, exactly at the cap, and applied in full they would have produced a forecast of 3.42%. The combined weight keeps 16.36% of that step, $-0.327$ log-odds, which gives 15.86% on a band of 7.37% to 27.28% (Table 3).
Table 2. Reconstruction inputs. Values reproduce the forecast’s arithmetic; the counts are a reference-class estimate.
| Input | Value |
|---|---|
| Reference-class successes and cases, $k$ and $n$ | 8 and 40 |
| Anchor and band, Eq. 1 | 20.73%, 9.94% to 34.22% |
| Band quantiles | 0.025 and 0.975 |
| Factor strengths: marginal, moderate, decisive | 0.2, 0.5, 1.0 log-odds |
| Cap on the summed factors | $-2$ to $+2$ log-odds |
| Evidence weight $\lambda$ | 0.5 |
| Variants tried, $V$ | 61: 27 versions of the argument and 34 reference-class searches |
| Selection weight | 0.3273 |
| Combined weight $w$ | 0.1636 |
| Forecast and band, Eq. 3 | 15.86%, 7.37% to 27.28% |
Each factor’s effect in Table 3 is the change in the final forecast when that factor’s shrunk step is removed. Because the steps combine on the log-odds scale, the five effects do not add exactly to the 4.87-point move from anchor to forecast.
Table 3. The five scored factors, their signed and shrunk log-odds, and each one’s effect on the forecast in percentage points.
| Factor | Direction | Signed log-odds | Shrunk log-odds | Effect on forecast |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core inflation at target | lowers | $-1.0$ | $-0.164$ | $-2.31$ |
| Seven consecutive holds | lowers | $-0.5$ | $-0.082$ | $-1.12$ |
| Trade dispute weighs on growth | lowers | $-0.5$ | $-0.082$ | $-1.12$ |
| Bank economists expect a hold | lowers | $-0.2$ | $-0.033$ | $-0.44$ |
| Hawkish energy language | raises | $+0.2$ | $+0.033$ | $+0.43$ |
| Sum | $-2.0$ | $-0.327$ |
The gap to the market splits into two steps, from Polymarket’s midpoint $m$ to the anchor and from the anchor to the forecast (Eq. 4).
With $m=38.0%$ the first step is $-17.27$ points and the second $-4.87$, so the base rate makes 78.0% of the $-22.14$-point gap (Fig. 2). Solving Eq. 3 for the count that would land the forecast on the midpoint, with the same factors, gives $k=18.34$ in 40. Run the other way, an anchor equal to the market’s 38.0% would have produced a forecast of 30.64%.
Limitations
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Recalled base rate. The 8 in 40 is a reference-class estimate recalled from published central-bank records, and it has not been counted from an archive. It carries 78% of the gap to the market, so counting an archive of G7 and other advanced-economy rate decisions since 2000 against the class definition is the next step.
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Overlap between the class and the forces. The class already conditions on long holds, warnings of upside inflation risk and core inflation inside the 1% to 3% band, and three scored forces cover related ground: trim and median at or under the 2% midpoint, the seven holds, and the hawkish language on the September energy spike. Each force is a narrower fact than the matching class condition, but part of the evidence may be counted twice. Scoring the forces against a class defined without those conditions is the next step.
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Bands. The bands in Fig. 1 are arithmetic on the reference-class estimate and have not been checked against outcomes. A scored series of forecasts is what would test them.
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Factor scores. The five factors were scored by judgment, and some share a source: the Bank’s September 16 summary supports both the trade factor and the energy factor. Linking each factor to its own observation would let its score be checked.
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Forecasters’ view. The economists factor as recorded rests on a wider hold view than the public record shows. The traced sources are TD Economics, writing after the August CPI, and National Bank Financial, writing before it; tracing each named bank’s call at the time of the forecast is the next step.
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One question. On the same day the forecast also registered related questions about the October and December decisions, each estimated separately. This paper reports the October quarter-point hike because it is the question the argument is about, whether the Bank reverses course with a hike, and it is the first to be decided. Polymarket’s October no-change contract for the same announcement is its mirror at the market, but our estimate for it was made separately and is not reported. Estimating the October and December outcomes jointly, so that their numbers add up, is the next step.
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One forecast. A single decision cannot show whether either number was calibrated, and the Polymarket book held about $3,014 of liquidity when quoted (Table 1). Establishing calibration or an edge over the market takes a scored series of forecasts.
This is an exploratory analysis of one forecast, not a pre-registered test.
Reproducing it
The analysis runs offline in Python 3.12.3 with SciPy 1.18.1, on the public data cited above. It checks that its arithmetic matches the recorded anchor, band and forecast within $10^{-10}$, so any drift in an input stops the run. On September 24, 2026 it ran top to bottom on a clean kernel with no errors.
References
- Bastati, K. (2026). Oil futures diverge to end volatile trading week. DTN, September 18.
- Bank of Canada. (2026a). Bank of Canada maintains the policy rate at 2¼%. Interest rate announcement, September 2.
- Bank of Canada. (2026b). Policy interest rate. Rate table and 2026 announcement dates; retrieved September 24.
- Bank of Canada. (2026c). Summary of Governing Council deliberations: Fixed announcement date of September 2, 2026. September 16.
- Bank of Canada. (2026d). Monetary policy. Section on monitoring inflation; retrieved September 24.
- Bank of Canada. (2026e). Blackout guidelines. Retrieved September 24.
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2026). Federal Funds Target Range, Upper Limit (DFEDTARU). FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; retrieved September 24.
- European Central Bank. (2008a). Introductory statement with Q&A. Press conference, July 3.
- European Central Bank. (2008b). Monetary policy decisions. Press release, October 8.
- European Central Bank. (2011). Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A). April 7.
- European Central Bank. (2026). Key ECB interest rates. Retrieved September 24.
- Macklem, T. (2026). Navigating uncertainty and adapting to change. Speech to the Halifax Partnership, Bank of Canada, September 21.
- Polymarket. (2026). Will the Bank of Canada increase the target for the overnight rate by 25 bps at the October interest rate announcement?. Contract rules and quotes; retrieved September 20 and 24.
- Preston, L. (2026). Canadian Consumer Price Index (August 2026). TD Economics, September 14.
- Schleich, T., and Currie, E. (2026). Fading tariffs and fearing inflation. BoC Policy Monitor, National Bank Financial, September 2.
- Statistics Canada. (2026a). Consumer Price Index, August 2026. The Daily, September 14.
- Statistics Canada. (2026b). Table 4: Consumer Price Index (CPI) statistics, measures of core inflation, Bank of Canada definitions. The Daily, September 14.
- Statistics Canada. (2026c). 2026-2027 release dates, Major economic releases. June 10.
- Statistics Canada. (2026d). Table 1: Consumer Price Index, major components and special aggregates, Canada, not seasonally adjusted. The Daily, September 14.
- The Canadian Press. (2026). Odds of an interest rate hike from Bank of Canada this year have jumped. BNN Bloomberg, September 18.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026). Crude Oil Prices: Brent, Europe (DCOILBRENTEU). FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; retrieved September 24.